How should marketers communicate risk information? In discussing this question, I start with basic economic theory and expected-utility (EU) theory. Then I discuss the limitations resulting from misestimation of probability, the need to deal with many risks at once, and the existence of individual differences in risk preference. I then review the problem of cognitive biases such as the tendency to favor harms of omission over harms of direct action. I conclude with suggestions about the design of risk communication that take these factors into account. And I ask the question in a general sense, which applies to all goods and services sold or given away by government, private business, or individuals. I shall talk about the buyer and seller.
bother to collect that datum. Given that some datum is worth knowing, then the responsibility should be on the seller just when the seller's cost of collecting the information is lower than the total cost of collection to all the potential buyers.
Comparison of costs of collection is not trivial. Even if we measure cost in monetary terms (rather than in terms of utility), assessment of the cost of the buyer providing the information requires us to consider the effect of the monetary expenditures (e.g., on research) on the price of the good, and therefore on the number of people who would buy the good (or on government budgets if government pays). The price of drugs, for example, is driven up by necessary expenditures on drug testing. These expenditures lead to higher drug prices and decreased availability. There is clearly some optimal amount of testing, but it is not so clear what that optimum is. Higher costs for the good also lead to reduced benefit for buyers, as when people must spend a high proportion of their income on drugs. Thus, for example, rules that require testing of new drugs on children could conceivably be harmful even to the children involved. If most drugs that work on adults also work on children, it may be better not to test them, so that the price can be kept low to allow more children to get them.
If we try to use utility rather than money as the measure of costs, one approach is to calculate the monetary costs and then correct these for the utility of money to those who bear the costs (Baron, 1993) . As a rough guide, we may assume that the utility of money decreases with income. We must balance the costs to taxpayers, stockholders, and consumers, on the basis of estimates of some summary measure of income for each group. It is no wonder that such calculations are rarely considered in discussions of policy. Instead, policy makers often bring in crude notions of equity or fairness. (But see Kaplow and Shavell, 2002 , for why such notions are at best approximations.) When those affected are all in the same nation, the monetary Risk communication 3 approximation may be reasonable. When the consumers are in poorer nations, the differences in the utility of money are clearly worth considering. I shall not discuss this issue further in this article. It would draw me off the track I want to pursue.
Benefit of information to consumers
The expected utility of information to an individual buyer is the difference between the EU of the buyer's choice with the information and the EU of the buyer's choice without it. This difference has two components.
One comes from the possibility that the information will change the buyer's choice. If the information will not change the buyer's decision, then it has no utility of this sort. Of course, information may have positive utility for some buyer and zero utility for some other buyer. So long as we continue to assume that buyers follow expected-utility theory, information cannot have negative utility for them.
The second source of utility consists of a variety of effects of information other than those that affect decisions. For example, when we have dental work or surgery, it helps if someone tells us what is going to happen, when it will hurt, what kind of after-effects to expect, and so on. The benefits include the avoidance of negative surprise reactions. Conversely, we are harmed when someone tells us the outcome of a mystery story before we finish it, or the winner of a tennis match before we watch the videotape we made of it. We learn to avoid newsgroup postings that say, "spoiler" in their headers. Thus, information can have negative effects even when people follow EU in their decisions. I suspect that all of these effects are mediated, one way or another, by emotions. (In other words, I cannot think of a counterexample to this generalization.)
To a first approximation, the assumption that buyers maximize EU may be close enough for us to draw some practical conclusions. One is that the utility of warnings depends on alternatives. If someone has no realistic alternative -such as a typical cancer patient about to get a standard therapy that is effective but unpleasant -information about the probability of success in different patient groups is highly unlikely to change the patient's decision and may promote excessive worry. Information about the nature of side effects may still be useful in preventing negative surprise and helping the patient make secondary decisions like what to tell her employer.
It is of interest that the requirements of law and ethics rarely consider the potential negative effects of information, such as worry, although traditional attitudes certainly take these into account. Perhaps we are seeing an institutional reaction to what was thought to be excessive paternalism. But is it really necessary to include a long list of potential side effects on a warning label for a drug that is the only effective treatment 
Penalties for misinformation
The emotionless version of the theory may be useful in determining the appropriate legal penalties for bad information, which includes both active and passive misrepresentation. Passive misrepresentation is failure to warn when warning would be best. Active misrepresentation is provision of false information. The normative analysis of these two cases is the same. Both are compared to the optimal behavior.
As a hypothetical example, suppose that an insurance company has lied about what it insures. It claims to insure some treatment but then refuses to pay for it. This example is interesting because it shows how even such a simple theory can provide clarity (I hope) about a surprisingly complex problem.
Consider the case of a single consumer. Figure 1 shows the cost to the company and the cost to the consumer of different hypothetical policies. Assuming that the money is well spent, greater cost to the company means greater benefit to the consumer, although not necessarily as a linear function.
The consumer's indifference curves are the thin curved lines. The axes are the cost to the consumer (horizontal) and cost of the coverage to the company. The heavy diagonal line shows the company's breakeven point. At all points on this line, the company makes enough to cover its costs and to satisfy its stockholders with a reasonable profit.
In an ideal economic world, the consumer would be able to choose any point on the break-even line.
Points below the line will not be offered because someone could make money by offering the same coverage at a lower price. Points above the line will not be offered because the company would lose money on them.
In practice, companies will offer only a few options at most. But let us assume that, in the long run, this line describes the choices available to the consumer. Point A represents the optimal coverage -given the consumer's indifference curves -which is what the rational consumer would choose in the ideal world with full information.
Point B represents what a deceptive company says it is providing: a policy that provides more coverage for less cost than the break-even line would require.
Point C represents what the company is actually providing, a policy that isn't as good as the break-even line. (I am assuming that the company is lying in order to profit.)
The utility of the harm to the consumer is thus U (A) − U (C). This is the difference between what the consumer gets and what he would get in the ideal world. What should the company pay as a penalty if it is caught in this deception? If we wanted to "make the consumer whole," we would have to give him the monetary equivalent of this utility difference. That is the horizontal difference between C and point D. Point D is the price that gives the consumer the same utility as the ideal (A). To estimate this difference, we would need both the indifference curves and the break-even line.
This solution is would provide compensation for the harm done. If there were several consumers involved, as in a class-action lawsuit, we would have to estimate the D-C difference for each consumer. In practice, this would require data from the same population, except that the subjects need not be involved in the lawsuit (in which case they would probably exaggerate). This would give us the distribution of parameters of the indifference curves.
The economic theory of tort law does not put much stock in making the victim whole as a general solution to the problem of penalties, as distinct from compensation. Instead, the idea is to provide incentive to behave optimally. In this case, telling the truth is optimal. Compensation, in theory, is best provided by insurance, or social insurance, and penalties are best paid to the insurer or government rather than to victims. This is Risk communication 6 because, as we shall see, optimal penalties and optimal compensation need not be the same.
If we wanted to provide incentives to the company to tell the truth, we would penalize the company by the vertical distance between C and B. This would mean that the company could not make any money by claiming to provide more than it does provide. Assuming that the company is always caught, this would provide the minimum penalty to deter lying. (If the probability of detection were 50%, we would double the penalty, and so on.)
To estimate the C-B difference, we would not need any psychological data. We would need data on costs to the company of what it claims to provide vs. what it does provide. Notice that the C-B difference is not necessarily the same as the D-C difference required to make the consumer whole.
Note that there is a third possibility for our measure of the cost of deception: the difference between the utility for the consumer of what was promised and the utility of what was provided. This would be relevant if the question were simply "How much harm was done (ex ante) to the consumer?" But this is about the insurance policy, not the information. If this were the issue, the compensation required to make the consumer whole would be determined by drawing a horizontal line through C, to the left, and looking at where it hits the indifference curve that goes through B, i.e., E. The monetary equivalent of this harm would be the horizontal distance between points C and E. In general, though we have no reason to adopt this distance as a penalty or as compensation.
Cognitive limits
If consumers made decisions according to EU (taking emotions into account, of course), and if they could incorporate stated probabilities into these decisions, then it would suffice for sellers to provide them with a list of potential bad outcomes, each with its probability. This strategy has several limitations.
Misestimation of probability
When smokers are asked about their risk of lung cancer, they generally over-estimate it. Yet, non-smokers are likely to over-estimate more than smokers (Viscusi et al., 2000) . Such findings are typical. People seem to over-estimate small probabilities (less than 50%).
If people think that a given risk is 10%, and they are informed that it is actually 5%, they may well believe that it is less serious than they previously thought. Yet their behavior may be in line with their Alternatively, Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) implies that low stated probabilities have more effect on behavior than they should, and this effect has been repeatedly confirmed. But, on the other hand again, McClelland et al. (1993) found that some people are not willing to pay anything to reduce a very low probability of a very bad event, as if they considered the probability to be essentially zero. We know very little about which of these effects dominates, in what situations.
Worry budgets and the need for a comparative approach
Risk communication is useful for decisions (as oppose to emotions) only if it leads some people to change their behavior. Risk warnings must be capable of inducing someone not to buy a good. Not buying a good is thus a protective behavior (PB), like wearing seat belts.
According to EU, people should undertake a PB when its expected cost in time, effort, and/or forgone utility is less than its expected benefit in avoiding harm. Yet, people are faced with hundreds of possible PBs. Almost every food we eat seems to have some chance of causing some dread disease. Every medical procedure, every form of transportation, every financial transaction, seems to have some risk. If people lack the information to follow EU, or if they cannot calculate the cost-benefit comparison for each PB, they may feel overwhelmed. They may feel that they have a "worry budget." There is only so much a person can worry about.
Moreover, the cost of a PB typically increases, the more PBs are being done. As you forgo more and more foods to avoid pesticide residue, saturated fat, trans fat, refined sugar, staphylococcus, mercury, E. coli, artificial color, environmental estrogens, chlorine, endangered species, and bleached wheat, you are left with fewer and fewer choices. As you spend more time and money on safety devices, each additional hour or dollar means more to you. Thus, an EU calculation in isolation, as if no other PBs were involved, does not tell the whole story. Giving up tuna fish to avoid mercury might be a good move if that is all you gave up. But, if you adopt a consistent criterion, then you need to give up lots of other things, and the relative utility of an occasional tuna sushi may increase.
Thus, people should, and probably do, compare PBs to one another. The issue is not so much whether each is worthwhile on its own but, rather, what set of PBs is most effective together.
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This conclusion implies that risk information might be most useful if it is comparative. When we were told that Alar -a treatment for apples -causes cancer, it would have been nice if we were also told about the seriousness of eating Alar-treated applies vs. other cancer-causing risks. If it turns out that a bushel of apples has the same risk as one cigarette, then, especially given the other benefits of apples, the risk is probably negligible. Kunreuther et al. (2001) used subjective scales to evaluate feelings of risk. They found that large differences in probability of a chemical accident had no effect on these feelings in a between-subject design, unless the subject was given a vividly described risk to use as a point of comparison, for example, the probability of an automobile accident on a certain type of road within a certain time period.
Notice that such comparative information would go a long way toward solving the problem of probability mis-estimation. Whether people generally over-or under-responds to probability information should not affect how they evaluate PBs relative to one another.
Individual differences
Just as risk communication should consider the comparison of risks to one another, it should perhaps also consider the comparison of people to one another. People differ in risk aversion. Some of these differences are general, cutting across different substantive areas. For example, women are generally more risk averse than men (Byrnes et al., 1999) .
The standard view of risk aversion is that it results from a concave utility function. But this theory applies to money. It is hard to see how it applies to trade-offs between the desire to visit interesting places and the possibility of terrorist attacks on airplanes. The idea of loss aversion, from Prospect Theory, might provide a better descriptive account. People who are averse to risks might think of harms as losses and try to avoid them at all costs. We really do not know the origin of individual differences in risk aversion.
Without knowing where risk aversion comes from, we cannot tell whether it is rational. It makes sense, though, to assume that at least some of it is based on true individual differences in utility, not some sort of bias. Insofar as such differences exist, we must consider these individual differences when we communicate risk information. Even if all such differences were due to bias, failure to consider them would represent a kind of paternalism that assumes that "we," the ones who decide what to tell people, know better than the people themselves. The problem is that we, too, may be biased.
It may turn out that individual differences can provide a useful tool for communicating about risk. For Risk communication 9 example, instead of telling people that the probability of harm is 10%, suppose we told them, "the probability of harm is high enough so that 20% of the people who would otherwise buy this good -if there were no chance of harm -will forgo it, because of the risk." Such a statement would combine information about utility of the good (in the absence of risk) and probability of harm, but it might still be useful. To decide whether to buy the good, the consumer could ask herself, "Am I in the upper 80% in terms of desire for the good vs. risk of harm?" Perhaps a realistic example is the standard practice of open-source software such as Linux, Xemacs, or Mozilla (http://www.mozilla.org), where programs typically go through an alpha, beta, sometimes gamma, and "stable" versions. The alpha and beta versions typically come with warnings saying that they are for "testers," thus specifying the risk level by specifying the sort of person who would be willing to take the risk. Of course, the warnings sometimes include specifics, usually designed to scare away the weak of heart and encourage risk-seeking macho hackers, e.g., from http://www.xemacs.org/Releases/, "The beta series of releases is for testers. . . . Users should prepare themselves for crashes, data loss, freezes, and other unpleasant events."
People do not follow EU: Biases
Of course, people systematically deviate from EU. At issue is how sellers should respond to various biases.
Let us consider three examples: availability, proportionality, and omission bias.
Availability
It is well known that people over-respond to risks that are highly available because of news coverage or immediacy (e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, 1999) . Such risks are "available," in people's minds. The result is that people mis-allocate their protective behavior. They may, for example, avoid taking walks in the summer because of fear of West Nile virus, while putting themselves at greater risk of heart disease and diabetes by failing to get any exercise at all.
Proportionality
People tend to think of risks in terms of proportions rather than differences (Baron, 1997; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997) . Differences in risk, not ratios, are relevant to EU theory. But people may think it is more important to reduce a 1% risk of some harm to zero then to reduce a 10% risk of the same harm to 5%. It Risk communication 10 is thus possible to increase people's concern with a risk by framing the situation narrowly, e.g., telling them that something will increase the risk of a particular form of cancer by 50% when the cancer in question is so rare that such an increase is trivial as a proportion of cancer risk in general.
Omission bias
People are more concerned about the harms that result from action than those that result from omission (Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca et al., 1991) . In extreme cases, people may sometimes resist vaccination because of the risk of side effects, even when the risk of failing to vaccinate is greater (Meszaros et al., 1996) .
The phenomenon seems to result from a belief that actions cause the harm. Causality is important, not action as such. Thus, actions with direct harmful effects are considered worse than those with indirect effects (Royzman & Baron, 2002) . For example, in a scenario in which some rare zoo animals are infected with parasites, subjects thought it was worse to kill the infected animals (to keep the infection from spreading) than to use a drug that would kill the parasites but kill the same number of healthy animals as a side effect.
As a further step, Ritov and Baron (1990; Baron & Ritov, 1994 ; also recent unpublished data) have found that giving a vaccine that fails to prevent X cases of a disease is not as bad as causing X cases through side effects of the vaccine. Indeed, failing to prevent X cases is roughly equivalent to failing to vaccinate and getting the same result. Note that the zoo case involved side effects as the control condition. We can thus imagine three levels of causality: omission, indirect causation (side effects), and direct causation (using the harm as a means to a good end). Each level is considered worse than the preceding level.
Bias in the law: the problem of activity level
The law itself incorporates omission bias. Pharmaceutical companies are sued for the side effects of their drugs. They are not sued for failing to produce a drug or failing to do research on one. As a result, some companies have withdrawn drugs that have led to lawsuits even when the drugs were beneficial, letting the price increase (Baron, 1998) . And nobody sues anyone for failing to invest sufficient resources in research on malaria vaccines. Similarly, obstetricians are sued when babies are born with defects, but they are not sued for giving up obstetrics, even when doing so means longer and more risky travel for expectant mothers in their region. 1 1 Of course, many medical lawsuits are about omissions, e.g., failure to do a test or provide an additional treatment. But they are omissions on a background of ongoing action. An obstetrician is not sued for failing to use a fetal monitor if she has given up her obstetric practice in favor of gynecology.
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This asymmetry distorts the functioning of free markets. It reduces the extent to which people engage in activities that have both benefits and risks. It leads people to pursue activities that are safe, even if not as beneficial overall.
2 This distortion is one of the problems of tort law in general, and particularly medical malpractice law.
Libertarian paternalism
Marketing researchers often think of biases as opportunities to induce people to buy something. Such an approach is not necessarily bad. People may benefit from goods that they would not spontaneously choose, such as medical screening tests. We might ask, however, what a more balanced public-policy response would look like.
We should be cautious in trying to correct biases or compensate for them, even assuming that we are sure that the biases are harmful. For one thing, people differ in the magnitude of biases, and some people may even show the reverse of the usual bias. Biases are also notoriously labile. They come and go with seemingly minor changes in the situation. Thus, an attempt to correct a common bias may mis-fire if the bias is not present or only weakly present in the situation at hand.
Finally, biases may work together to restore a kind of artificial equilibrium that works for normal situations, so that correcting one bias without correcting another one can make things worse. For example, according to Prospect Theory, people are risk seeking in the domain of monetary losses (which is an apparent bias, since the harm done by a given loss is surely greater, in general, for those who are poorer). This risk attitude would make people reluctant to buy insurance that is worthwhile according to EU. But people also over-weigh low probabilities, so they buy insurance because they exaggerate the probability of loss. The over-weighing bias thus compensates for the risk-seeking in losses. If the over-weighing of low probabilities were corrected, people would do the wrong thing. Sunstein and Thaler (2003) have provided a general approach to dealing with biases in public policy, which avoids most of these problems. It is to do the best we can, taking into account all we know about biases, but, at the same time, leave people free to make their own decisions or seek more information. We (the marketers) set the default options, but we let the consumers over-ride these options. They call this approach "libertarian paternalism." It is paternalistic because it tries to help people by assuming that we know better than they do. Yet it is also libertarian because it ultimately does not constrain their choices.
Conclusion
How should we communicate about risk, then, taking all the considerations I have raised into account? I make the following suggestions:
Comparative: Risk communication should be comparative. We should, whenever possible, compare risks to other risks. We should convey the message that rational behavior in the face of risk means correct ordering.
If we consider a set of PBs, we should rank the PBs in terms of their EU -taking into account both risk reduction and the cost of the PB -and we should undertake those PBs that have the highest EU. What is irrational is to undertake a costly and ineffective PB while failing to undertake another one that is less costly or more effective. For example, consider someone who drinks unfiltered water contaminated with E.
coli, and, at the same time, pays extra for organic vegetables in order to avoid traces of pesticide residue. The warning attached to the beta version of Xemacs (http://www.xemacs.org -"Users should prepare themselves for crashes, data loss, freezes, and other unpleasant events") did not deter me, but the warning did not mention another risk: "won't use your old configuration files." Oh well. But I suspect that warnings Paternalistic about biases: How might marketers reduce biases? In as yet unpublished work, I have found that certain methods of "debiasing" are effective in reducing biases. One general method is to present the relevant consequences, making the means by which they are attained less salient. For omission bias, it helps to describe the consequences in terms of "options," without mentioning right away that one option is an act and the other an omission. People are more likely to think that the act-omission distinction is irrelevant when information is presented in this way. Similarly, for proportionality, it ought to help -although I have not tested it -to present information in terms of risk differences rather than ratios.
Availability is a more difficult problem because it does not have to do with risk communication as such.
Libertarian: The libertarian aspect of libertarian paternalism is about the law and about what is offered.
By a strictly libertarian view, no government or institution should withhold a good from anyone out of paternalism. Such a view would imply, for example, that drugs of all kinds -medicinal and recreationalshould be legal.
One argument for this view is that government regulation is susceptible to omission bias (Bazerman et al., 2001 , ch. 1). The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (F.D.A.) -and to a lesser extent its European counterpart the European Medicines Evaluation Agency -slow down or completely prevent the introduction of beneficial new drugs because of both the time and cost of the studies required to gain approval. We do not know how many drugs were never even tested because companies were discouraged by the review required.
An extreme alternative to the present system is to limit the government's role to that of policing risk information. As in the case of trade, it would be able to prosecute sellers for misrepresentation, including the withholding of information that would cause someone not to buy a product (i.e., information that was useful in terms of EU because it might change a decision). Of course, minor slips should not count. The issue must rise to the level of fraud, where the mis-communication is systematic and intentional, lest the government be too involved. Consumer organizations can fill the gap by providing, as they do now, product reviews or even certifications (such as those provided by Underwriters Laboratories -see http://www.ul.com/). approved for a specific purpose are used "off label" for purposes that have no government approval at all.
Such a change in the law would increase the burden on both sellers and the government to provide and evaluate risk information. In some cases, less information would be provided than is the case now.
For example, if drug package inserts were evaluated in terms of EU, the long lists of rare effects, with no probabilities and no evidence that they are caused by the drug, would probably be shortened considerably, focusing on information that could increase EU by changing a decision.
A less extreme change would allow the government to ban drugs but make approval the default. This would also require warning consumers when they were using a "beta release." Unlike the case of finding bugs in computer programs, the government might also want to ban drugs for the sole purpose of testing them. Once a drug becomes legal, it may be impossible to find subjects who are willing to be randomized into a placebo condition.
Quantitative: However it is provided, risk information must be quantitative. I have focused here on providing quantitative information in ways that are useful, i.e., by making it comparative or expressing it in terms of individual differences. But we must remember the point made by John McCarthy in his web page (http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/progress/): "He who refuses to do arithmetic is doomed to talk nonsense."
